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Poverty in Bolivia continues to be among the highest in Latin 
America despite decades of concerted national and international 
efforts to reduce it. Bolivia has meticulously followed the 
recommendations of the Washington consensus at the same time as 
external aid has been generous and foreign direct investment has 
boomed. Nevertheless, average productivity and incomes remain at 
the same low level as they were 50 years ago.  
          This paper suggests that the failure of previous development 
policies is due to a lack of social mobility in the country. Without 
social mobility, there is little incentive for people to invest in human 
and physical capital, and without investment there cannot be 
productivity growth. In addition, the lack of social mobility implies 
an inefficient use of human capital, and it hinders the construction of 
efficient social mechanisms for redistribution and consumption 
smoothing over the life-cycle.  
 
Keywords: Social Mobility, Development, Public Policy, Bolivia. 
JEL classification: E60, I32, J12, J13. 
                                                 
* This paper was prepared for The North-South Institute in the context of the Institute’s project: 
“Macroeconomic Policy Choices for Growth and Poverty Reduction.” The very constructive comments 
received from Rodney Schmidt, Clive W. J. Granger and Bent Jesper Christensen are highly apreciated, 
as is the help we received from our research assistant, Luis F. Lima Soria.   2
 
1 Introduction   
 
Poverty in Bolivia has become an endemic phenomenon. We were poor yesterday, we 
are poor today and, most likely, we will be poor tomorrow. Bolivia has experimented 
with almost all conceivable economic policies. We have nationalized, denationalized, 
privatized, capitalized and nationalized again, while we continue to be stuck in poverty. 
We have applied Keynesian programs to overcome economic crises and the results 
obtained were tremendously negative. Increased public expenditures only resulted in 
larger fiscal deficits, devaluations did not have a perceptible effect on our balance of 
payments (on the contrary, they only further restricted the productive apparatus by 
raising the prices of imported capital goods), and an expansive monetary policy only 
resulted in a reduction of net international reserves and a reduction in the purchasing 
power of the local currency due to inflationary pressures.  
 
Foreign aid to Bolivia has been extremely generous, in some years surpassing 10% of 
GDP. The same holds for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which has been attracted by 
Bolivia’s large reserves of natural gas and petroleum and by the privatization and 
liberalization of telephony, electricity, and several other important service sectors (Nina 
& te Velde 2003). While these large, targeted inflows of dollars have clearly contributed 
to improving access to basic services such as education, health, water, sanitation, 
electricity and telecommunication, the income earning capacity of the Bolivian people 
remains at the same level as it was 50 years ago (Andersen & Evia 2003).  
 
Due to a concerted poverty reduction strategy, heavily supported by the international 
development community, public expenditures in the social sectors have increased from 
around 6 percent of GDP in the early 1980s to 16 percent by 2001. Nevertheless, the 
resulting reduction in poverty has been frustratingly small (Mercado et al 2003). 
 
This paper will argue that the failure of the poverty reduction strategies in Bolivia arises 
from treating poverty as a static problem, while in reality it is a highly dynamic 
problem. A fifty percent poverty rate can mean two very different things. One 
interpretation might be that the whole population is poor half of the time; alternatively, 
one might conclude that 50 percent of the population is always poor, while the   3
remainder is unlikely to become trapped in poverty. The first is a much easier kind of 
poverty to deal with both at the private level and at a public policy level, since poverty 
is transitory for each household. This kind of poverty can be relieved through 
unemployment benefits, pension savings, borrowing, and a large set of other types of 
transfers aimed at smoothing consumption over the life cycle.  
 
On the other hand, if it is the same families who are poor all the time, it is much more 
difficult to develop strategies to alleviate the hardship. Poor people cannot save for 
harder times, as all times are hard times, and they cannot borrow against higher future 
income because they don’t expect their incomes to be any better in the future. From a 
social point of view, it is difficult to devise transfer mechanisms, as the transfers would 
always be one-way and unless the mechanism is capable of lifting the beneficiary out of 
poverty on a permanent basis, would need to be sustained for a lengthy period during 
the beneficiary’s lifetime. Few people are willing to pay high taxes if they don’t expect 
to receive any benefits from those taxes themselves, and the perverse incentives 
generated by non-transitory social welfare programs further limit their usefulness. 
 
While a tremendous amount of attention has been paid to poverty and inequality during 
the last decade, very little attention has centered on the dynamics of poverty and 
inequality, which we will call social mobility. If social mobility is high, people move 
around in the income distribution from year to year and from generation to generation 
depending partly on their own efforts (how much they study, how hard they work, how 
much they save, how they invest) and partly on external factors (health, luck, changing 
family composition, macroeconomic conditions, etc.). 
 
If social mobility is low, on the other hand, people are stuck at a specific place on the 
income distribution scale year after year and generation after generation - only an 
enormous amount of effort or luck can change this situation. This is not only unfair and 
difficult to alleviate through redistribution, it also tends to reduce the amount of effort 
and investment in the country, as there is no link between effort and result. Poor people 
are unlikely to make the sacrifices involved in studying many years, working hard, 
saving, and investing, if they don’t expect that effort pay off in the future. This creates a 
vicious circle as the expectation that effort will not return benefits, will in turn prevent   4
them from making an effort. This self-fulfilling prophesy leads to people not making an 
effort that could possibly improve their situation. 
 
The few empirical studies on social mobility that have recently surfaced unanimously 
agree that Bolivia has very low social mobility (Behrman, Birdsall & Székely 1998; 
Dahan & Gaviria 2000; Andersen 2001). This implies that poverty is permanent and 
extremely difficult to either reduce or alleviate. In addition, low social mobility reduces 
incentives for growth, and since low growth reinforces low social mobility, the country 
is stuck in a vicious circle. Faced with this new dynamic view of Bolivia’s problems, 
the present paper discusses what has gone wrong with previous policies, and what can 
be done in the future to increase social mobility and thus leave the vicious circle of low 
social mobility, low growth, and permanent poverty. 
   
The paper is divided into five sections. This first section serves as an introductory 
overview of the work. The second section presents a revision of the theoretical and 
empirical work on the relationship between social mobility and development. The third 
section presents a short diagnosis of the macroeconomic situation that has characterized 
our economy over the past two decades, discussing what has been done to reduce 
poverty and the results obtained to date. Section four investigates the sources of the lack 
of social mobility in Bolivia and discusses what can be done to improve the situation. 
Section five provides some concluding remarks and suggests areas of future research.  
 
2  Social Mobility and Development 
 
2.1  Review of the Theoretical Literature 
The theoretical literature on development is vast, but the ones taking into account social 
mobility are very few. They all arrive at the conclusion that high social mobility is 
associated with higher economic growth, but the transmission mechanisms between 
mobility and growth differ between the models. 
 
Raut (1996) develops an endogenous growth model where the growth rate depends on 
the quantity and quality of technological and scientific research. In turn, the level of 
research depends on the talents and educational level of the researchers. Only   5
researchers with particular talents and a minimum necessary level of education can 
perform research that furthers economic growth. People with an excellent education but 
without sufficient talent cannot contribute to economic growth. The same thing happens 
with very talented people lacking the necessary education. The conclusion of this model 
is that growth is maximized when people receive an education that corresponds to their 
talent. The model supposes that talents are randomly distributed among the population 
and that the individual level of talents is private information. Employers cannot observe 
the level of the employees’ innate talents, which creates asymmetric information 
important for the functioning of the model. 
 
Education improves the productivity of employees and it also provides clues to their 
individual talent levels. Raut’s model presumes that achieving a certain level of 
education is more expensive for people with lesser talent in comparison to those with 
more talent. Also, to introduce intergenerational relationships, the model supposes that 
obtaining education is less expensive for children of educated parents.    
    
Each person chooses his or her education level by taking costs and benefits into 
account. The benefits are the wages that employers offer. Employers will offer higher 
wages for better educated people, not only because they should be more productive, but 
also because they should have more innate talent. The difference in wages for people 
with less education and people with more education depends on employers’ 
expectations regarding the relationship between innate talents and education. If 
employers believe that education is a good indicator of innate talents, they will conclude 
that educated people are more productive. Employers’ can thus offer them higher 
wages. On the other hand, if employers’ believe that education is not a good indicator of 
innate talents, people with more education are not necessarily deemed more productive 
and thus will not be offered higher wages.   
   
While offered wages are important for decisions on education, employers’ expectations 
become very important for growth. If employers believe that education is a good 
indicator of innate talents (that the education level depends more on the innate talents 
than the level of parents' education), they will offer better returns to education. As a   6
consequence, employees will opt for more education, which will make them more 
productive. With more productive workers the economic growth rate will be higher.    
   
The model generates a variety of possible equilibriums. One kind of equilibrium 
(pooling equilibrium) is that all employees choose the same education level and, 
therefore, all will receive the same wage. We can call this equality, but it does not 
produce the maximum level of possible growth. In this scenario education does not 
provide clues to employers about employee talent levels and productivity. As a result, 
employers will offer lower wages and the workers will also choose lower education 
levels.   
   
There is a second equilibrium (separating equilibrium), where the workers will choose 
different education levels depending on their talents and the education of their parents. 
At the extreme of this second equilibrium, the education of the parents determines the 
education of their children. We can call this zero social mobility. This equilibrium does 
not generate an optimum growth level, for the reasons previously stated. A third 
possible equilibrium consists of all employees who have the same innate talents 
choosing the same education level, independent of their family background. This can be 
called equilibrium with equality of opportunities. Raut shows that in this case the rate of 
growth is higher than in the previous cases. He also shows that the case with maximum 
growth belongs to the group with equality of opportunities.  
     
To move an economy from a low social mobility–low growth equilibrium to a high 
mobility–high growth equilibrium will require a change in the employers’ self-fulfilling 
expectations about the importance of family background compared to the importance of 
innate talents. One way of achieving this change could be a government policy targeted 
at making the optimal education available for all children independent of their family 
background. This, in turn, requires a wide range of policy initiatives, ranging from pre-
natal care to college loans.  
 
Galor & Tsiddon (1997) also explore the links between technological progress, wage 
inequality, social mobility and growth, and develop a model that creates cyclical 
patterns in all four variables. The model assumes that there are two factors that   7
determine earnings: the individual’s innate ability and parental human capital. In 
periods of major inventions, innate ability becomes relatively more important, while the 
relative importance of family background diminishes. This means higher social 
mobility, but also higher wage inequality because of a higher concentration of high-
ability, better-educated individuals in technologically advanced sectors. This 
concentration of human capital in technologically advanced sectors would stimulate 
further inventions and future output growth. In subsequent periods, when the new 
technologies become more accessible to the rest of society, parental human capital will 
become relatively more important again, thus decreasing earnings mobility and 
decreasing inequality while making the latter more persistent. The model has the 
unlikely implication that userfriendliness – placing technological advances within the 
reach of most members of society - is bad for growth.  
 
The analysis suggests that earnings mobility governs the pace of technological progress 
and output growth, while technological progress determines the degree of wage 
inequality and intergenerational earnings mobility. One of the conclusions of the paper 
is that social impediments to earnings mobility may distort the allocation of talent 
across occupations, thus reducing the pace of new inventions and output growth. 
 
The links between growth and social mobility are also explored in a study by Hassler & 
Mora (2000). The model includes two types of individuals: workers and entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs are the ones that generate new ideas and new technologies and make the 
economy grow. The more intelligent the entrepreneurs the higher the growth rate of the 
economy. Intelligence is randomly distributed among all people. With low social 
mobility the current generation of entrepreneurs mainly consists of the children of the 
previous generation of entrepreneurs. From an intellectual point of view, they are a 
random sample of society’s entire population, and consequently, they have average 
levels of intelligence. The entrepreneurs are therefore not particularly innovative, and 
they do not change the world substantially. The entrepreneurs do, however, confront 
economic challenges, and they learn from these and pass this knowledge on to their 
children. This is sufficient to give the children of entrepreneurs the slight advantage that 
will make them the entrepreneurs of the next generation. Consequently, the intelligence   8
of entrepreneurs in an economy with low social mobility will remain at an average 
level, and the economy will grow only moderately. 
 
In an economy with high social mobility, on the other hand, the entrepreneurial class is 
formed by the most intelligent people irrespective of their family background. Since the 
entrepreneurs are very intelligent they can generate a great deal of technological change 
and rapid growth. They thus make the world change rapidly, and the experience that 
they can pass on to their children depreciates so quickly that it is of little or no value. 
The next generation of entrepreneurs will thus be formed by intellectually gifted people 
rather than necessarily the children of entrepreneurs, since the children of entrepreneurs 
have no particular advantage in a rapidly changing world. This implies that the 
economy with high social mobility will enjoy consistently higher growth. 
 
Several other papers show how the allocation of talent in an economy is important for 
the level of growth. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1991), for example, show that when 
talented people are attracted to the productive sector, they create high growth, but if 
they instead are attracted to rent seeking activities, they create stagnation. Their model 
has an interesting implication regarding discrimination in a country where rent seeking 
is the most lucrative sector (which could be the case in Bolivia
1). If talented people are 
attracted to the rent seeking sector because it offers the highest returns, then 
discrimination may actually cause higher growth. This is the case if a dominant group 
monopolizes access to the rent seeking sector, because then the more intelligent people 
from the excluded population will have to work in the productive sector and thus some 
growth is generated. 
 
In a related paper, Baumol (1990) argues that while it may be difficult for economic 
policy to affect the supply and quality of entrepreneurs, it may be possible to affect the 
allocation of entrepreneurship between productive and unproductive sectors, such as 
rent seeking and organized crime. 
 
                                                 
1 Transparency International, a global coalition against corruption, monitors corruption perceptions 
around the world. According to their most recent figures (2003), Bolivia is 106
th out of 133 countries 
investigated (www.transparency.org) ranked with lesser corrupt nations at the top of the list. This is a 
relative improvement over the country’s assessment in 1997, where Bolivia was found to be the second 
most corrupt country in the world.   9
Hassler, Mora & Zeira (2002) develop a model where social mobility and wage 
inequality is determined simultaneously and endogenously. In this model they show that 
wage inequality has two opposing effects on upward social mobility: the incentive effect 
and the distance effect. When future wage inequality is expected to be high, this 
provides an incentive for investment in education, which increases upward mobility. 
However, high wage inequality also reduces the possibility for the poorest segments of 
the population to invest in education, thus decreasing their upward mobility. This 
second and opposing effect is called the distance effect. This undesirable effect can be 
partially counteracted by public investment in education, but the model also shows that 
educated parents are likely to be better at taking advantage of general public education, 
implying that public education expenditure may increase inequality of opportunity over 
time rather than decrease it. 
 
The implication of the above mentioned studies is that to achieve optimum growth it is 
important that people get the education that correspond to their innate talents and then 
gain access to work in sectors where they are most productive. This requires that young 
people’s educational and occupational choices be determined by talent and not limited 
by family background, or in other words, high growth requires a high degree of social 
mobility. In addition, it is important that there is a certain amount of wage inequality in 
the society in order to provide incentives for investment in education. On the other 
hand, inequality should not be too high, because that would prevent poor people from 
investing in education for their children. 
 
High social mobility is not a sufficient condition for high growth. It also requires that 
productive activities yield higher returns to talent than unproductive rent seeking 
activities. If talent is attracted to rent seeking activities rather than productive activities, 
then growth will be limited irrespective of the degree of social mobility present in the 
society. 
 
2.2  Review of the Empirical Literature 
There have been three important attempts at estimating social mobility in Bolivia and 
comparing it with social mobility in other Latin American countries (Behrman, Birdsall 
& Székely 1998; Dahan & Gaviria 2000; and Andersen 2001). All three studies use   10
standard household surveys, since there are no panel data sets available that cover the 
same families in Bolivia over time.  
 
The basic idea behind all three studies is to measure how important family background 
is in determining the educational outcomes of young people. If family background is 
important in determining young peoples’ educational level (and through that future 
income levels) social mobility is considered low. If family background is unimportant, 
social mobility is high.  
 
Behrman, Birdsall & Székely (1998) and Andersen (2001) measure the influence of 
family background directly in regressions with schooling gaps as the dependent variable 
and family background variables as explaining variables. Schooling gaps reflect missing 
years of education under the assumption that all children should start in school at age 6 
(or in some countries 7) and advance one grade each year until they are 19 years old. 
Grade repetition and school drop out generates schooling gaps, which are presumed to 
be negatively correlated with future income earning capacity. Dahan & Gaviria (2000) 
measure the influence of family background indirectly by calculating the correlation of 
schooling gaps between siblings. 
 
The advantage of the Dahan & Gaviria social mobility index is that it does not require 
the a priori definition of what family attributes are important (e.g. mother’s education, 
family wealth, parental attitudes, etc.) Their index controls for all influences that are 
common to all children in the same family. The disadvantage is that at least two siblings 
in the relevant age range are needed for each family. This implies a dramatic reduction 
in the sample of young people. Worse, the ones that are left out are unlikely to be 
similar to those that are included in the analysis, since teenagers with many siblings are 
much more likely to be included. 
 
Andersen (2001) provides some refinements and improvements to the method proposed 
in Behrman, Birdsall & Székely (1998). First, the method for determining the 
importance of family background (Fields’ decomposition (see Fields 1996)) is scale-
independent, so results do not depend on, for example, the currency in which income is 
measured. This allows for easy comparison across countries and regions. Second, the   11
method does not require a provision of weights for the different family background 
variables. Third, the method allows single parent households to be included in the 
analysis, because the maximum of mother’s and father’s years of education is used 
rather than both at the same time. Fourth, Andersen (2001) provides confidence 
intervals for all social mobility estimates, so that the reader can see whether different 
measures are actually statistically different. Fifth, in the case of Bolivia, Andersen 
(2001) provides national estimates, while Behrman, Birdsall & Székely (1998) only 
include urban Bolivia.  
 
Since Andersen (2001) is the only study that reports confidence intervals on the social 
mobility estimates, the current paper uses these estimates
2. The index is defined as one 
minus the importance of family background, implying that higher values of the index 
are associated with higher social mobility. Family background is proxied by the 
maximum number of years of education of the mother and the father and average adult 
per capita income in the household, and the importance of these two variables is 
measured by the Fields’ decomposition (see Fields 1996). Chart 1 shows the social 
mobility estimates for 18 countries in Latin America. 
 
The Chart suggests that Bolivia is among the least socially mobile countries in Latin 
America together with Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Peru, on the other hand, are among the most socially mobile countries in 
Latin America. The social mobility estimates for Uruguay and Argentina are based on 
urban samples only, but these two countries are so highly urbanized (> 80%) that this is 
almost representative for the whole country.  
 
                                                 
2 The methodology for estimating the Social Mobility Index is explained in detail in Appendix A.   12

























































































































































        
             Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Andersen (2001).  
             Note: * Based on urban samples only. 
 
The widths of the confidence intervals reflect the sample sizes used to estimate the 
index. The estimate for Brazil is based on 11761 teenagers, which implies a relatively 
precise estimate. The estimate for Peru is based on only 2800 teenagers, which implies a 
much wider confidence interval. 
 
Andersen (2001) finds a relatively strong positive correlation between Social Mobility 
and GDP per capita across 18 countries in Latin America, thus lending some empirical 
evidence to the theoretical arguments presented above.  
 
Chart 2 suggests that Argentina
3, Chile, and Uruguay are located in high growth – high 
social mobility equilibrium, while Guatemala, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Colombia are 
stuck in low growth – low social mobility equilibrium (assuming that the higher per 
capita GDPs are caused by higher long term growth rates).  
 
                                                 
3 This was measured prior to the Argentinian economic collapse – the GDP per capita figures were 
inflated by the artificial exchange rate.   13
Chart 2: Social mobility and GDP per capita 
            Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. 
               Source: Andersen (2001).  
 
The correlation between GDP per capita and the Social Mobility Index is 0.53 across 
Latin American countries. The relatively strong correlation, however, does not imply 
anything about the direction of causality. It may be that low social mobility causes low 
growth, or it may be that low growth causes low social mobility. Low growth and low 
mobility may also be jointly determined as the theoretical models discussed above have 
explored.  
 
Chart 3 shows that there is only a very weak or no correlation between social mobility 
and income inequality (ρ = –0.12). This corresponds to the theoretical review, which 
suggests that there is not necessarily any relationship between the two. Guatemala, 
Ecuador, Brazil, and Bolivia all have low social mobility and high income inequality. In 
these countries there is a large gap between rich and poor and there is little chance of 
crossing that gap. Chile, Paraguay, and Argentina also have high income gaps between 
rich and poor, but the chance of crossing the gap is substantially higher. This implies 
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Chart 3: Social mobility and income inequality  
                  Source: Andersen (2001). 
                 Notes: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. The GINI 
                  coefficients are from Székely and Hilgert (1999), and they are adjusted to be reasonably        
                  comparable across countries.  
 
 
While low mobility and high income inequality is clearly the worst combination, high 
mobility and low income inequality is not necessarily the best. There has to be a certain 
amount of inequality to provide incentives for people to study hard, work hard, be 
innovative, and take risks.  
 
   
3  Macroeconomic Context and Poverty Reduction Efforts 
 
The low social mobility in Bolivia is to a large extent historically determined. Before 
the 1952 revolution, the Bolivian economy essentially relied on the production of tin, an 
industry composed of three major private firms – Patiño, Hochschild and Aramayo 
Trading Co. – which, by providing around 2/3 of the state’s revenues, exerted 
extraordinary political and economic influence. At the same time, the agricultural 
system was based on large land holdings in the hands of a few, with an archaic quasi-
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Zabaleta, 2002). Wealth was concentrated in relatively few families with enormous 
economic and political influence to secure that public policies were working in their 
interests.  
 
The violent revolution in 1952 brought to power the National Revolutionary Movement 
(MNR) whose ideology consisted of overthrowing the mining-landlords oligarchy and 
creating a national state based on “state capitalism.” The mines were nationalized and 
land reforms were carried out. With the growing role of the state in the operations of the 
productive sector, the political realities favored the development of an elaborate system 
of “job patronage”, i.e. the use of state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) as political tools to 
hire supporters of the regime, and “clientilism” – the use of SOE public contracts to 
garner support from specific individuals or groups (Kaufman, Mastruzzi & Zabaleta, 
2002). Such a system also contributed to low social mobility, as jobs and contracts were 
allocated politically rather than on the basis of merit and productivity.  
 
This system continued and grew even stronger during Hugo Banzer’s dictatorship 
(1971-1978) as alliances were struck between members of the business community and 
the military regime, and trade unions and labor classes were subjected to repressive 
measures. Friends of the government, particularly in the military and among the private 
business community, were frequently favored with property rights over hitherto public 
lands, mining concessions, and most importantly, subsidized credit (Morales & Sachs, 
1990).  
 
Banzer’s reign was a period of relatively high growth (see Chart 4) due to favorable 
commodity prices, a boom in the production of gas, and large influxes of capital 
financed through heavy borrowing. In 1982, when external commodity prices 
plummeted and external capital dried up, a series of military governments gave way to a 
democratically elected government. However, the new government failed to make the 
necessary macroeconomic adjustments and instead led the country into a hyperinflation 
peaking at 25,000% annually in 1985. The crisis let to a dramatic reduction in output 
and drove a large number of firms into bankruptcy. However, during the same period, 
elite firms or individuals, with access to subsidized hard currency through special 
relations with the Central Bank could enrich themselves by reselling foreign currency in   16
the black market at 15 times its subsidized cost (Kaufman, Mastruzzi & Zabaleta, 
2002). 
 
Chart 4: GDP per Capita Rate of Growth – five year period 
                Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 
 
Thus, at least until 1985, Bolivia has been characterized by an extremely unlevel 
playing field, where public policy benefited the rich and influential, while the poor were 
adversely affected and had little chance of improving their situation. 
 
This started to change in 1985 when three times ex-president Victor Paz Estenssoro 
introduced the New Economic Policy (NEP) (through Supreme Decree No. 21060) 
which has become the axis of economic policy from that point on. The plan included a 
very successful stabilization package and basic economic policies in line with the 
Washington Consensus. The plan was later complemented by structural and social 
reforms, with heavy support from the international development community.  
 
The first generation of reforms took place during the period 1989 to 1993 when the fight 
against poverty became more explicit, largely due to the emphasis placed on the issue 










































































































































































and governmental budget support to social sectors began to increase as a percentage of 
total outlays (see Chart 5). 
 
Chart 5: Social Spending as % of GDP 
                Source: Mercado et al (2003).  
 
With the inclusion of Bolivia in 1997 in the HIPC program designed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, a new focus was given to poverty reduction strategies. According to 
figures prepared by CEDLA (2003), in the following table, public investment in social 

























































Housing and Basic Services
Social Security
Education  18
Table 1: Public Investment by Sectors (in percentages) 
Notes : As of 1992, investment from the Social Investment Fund (FIS) is included. 
As of 1995, estimated investment by municipalities is included. 
Source : CEDLA (2003).  
 
It was expected that such dramatic increases in social spending and investment would 
be beneficial for the poor, but although coverage rates of social services have indeed 
increased, and some substantially so, income poverty rates have remained stubbornly 
high, especially in rural areas. However, there is a time lag in the transmission of the 
effects of greater social spending on education and changes in poverty. The same may 
be said for social spending on housing, health and basic services, although the time lag 
is less clear. Thus, it may be too early to determine whether the new emphasis on social 
sector spending has been or will be effective in poverty reduction for the next 
generation. 
 
Due to lack of national household surveys before 1997, there is little hard statistical 
evidence on long term trends in income poverty, but Klasen & Thiele (2004) have 
recently made a bold attempt at estimating national poverty rates back to 1989 using a 
new methodology combining urban income surveys with national health surveys. Their 
results show dramatic reductions in income poverty in urban areas during the 1990s, but 
there appears to be a partial reversal during 2000-2002. In rural areas there was a 
moderate reduction in poverty during the 1990s, and only a small reversal during the 
recent crisis. This suggests that the rural sector has been relatively detached from the 
events that have caused the large increase in urban poverty (see Table 2), although rates 
remain extremely high with almost 84% of the rural population living in poverty. 
Sector  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Extractive  32,8 29,1 31,5 32,6 28,9 22,8 20,5 21,1 12,3 9,9 5,6 1,2  1,3  0,5 0,3
Productive 
Sectors  11,6 17 12,4 12,5 20,1 12,3 9,8 8,1 10,1 10 13,3 15,2 15,4 15,8 17,4
Infrastructure 45,3 45,2  45 36,5 42,1 49 52 45,7 42,3 39,4 36,1 35 33,4 34,8 36
Social  10,2 8,6 11,2 18,5 8,8 15,9 17,6 25,2 35,4 40,7 45,1 48,5 49,9 48,8 46,3
    Health  2 0,8 1,4 4,9 2,6 4,2 4,7 4,7 5 5,3 6 6,9 7,8  10,4 7,7
    Education  1,8 0,7 0,4 0,1 0,5 1,4 1,6 3 7,1 10,8 13,9 12,7  14,4  14,3 16,8
  
Basic 
services  4 4  7,6 12,1 3,2 6,4 7,3 7 8,8 14,3 14,6 16,3 18,6 15,6 11,7
    Housing    2,4 3,1 1,8 1,4 2,5 3,9 4 10,5 14,5 10,3 10,6 12,6 9,1 8,5 10,1
TOTAL  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 2: Poverty Trends using Moderate Poverty Line* 
 1989  1994  1999  2002 
 Simulated  Simulated  Observed  Observed 
Capital 
Cities 
64.8 57.4  51.1  55.1 
Towns 81.1  75.1  69.1  67.7 
Rural 89.7  89.6  83.4  83.8 
Total 76.9  72.4  65.2  67.2 
*The moderate poverty line is, in line with standard practice in Bolivia, 
applied to income in urban areas, and consumption in rural areas  
(as income data are considered not to be reliable there and consumption  
data are not available for the urban household surveys prior to 1997). 
Source: Klasen & Thiele (2004). Preliminary. 
 
The second generation of reforms occurred over the period 1994 to 1997, focusing on 
transforming the role of the State in the economy from that of producer to regulator and 
modernizing governmental institutions and frameworks. Regarding state efforts to 
combat poverty, the governmental decentralization reform is expected to have the most 
profound impacts in the medium and long term through a system of tax income 
redistribution to municipalities. 
 
In spite of nearly a decade of reforms and market liberalization, however, the 
composition of GDP growth has barely changed in the last 12 years (see Chart 6). The 
continuing dependence on agricultural activities (including agriculture, animal 
husbandry and fish production) combined with non-renewable resource extraction leave 
the country highly vulnerable to adverse shocks, especially to fluctuations in 
international commodity prices. 
   20
Chart 6: GDP by Economic Activity 
           Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas. 
 
With the resignation of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada in October 2003, and former Vice 
President Carlos Mesa assuming the presidency, the role of traditional political parties 
in helping Congress work with the Executive Branch on legislation has changed 
dramatically. The current president is not a member of any political party and has 
staffed his cabinet with apolitical ministers. While there is a sense that the current 
government is reaching out to legitimate leaders of different social sectors to redirect 
public policy, it is perhaps too early to determine whether the inclusion of different 
voices and viewpoints in the design of macroeconomic policy can bring about greater 
social mobility and a significant reduction in poverty.  
 
4  How to Increase Social Mobility and Long Run Growth? 
 
A variety of factors affect the level of social mobility in a country. The most important 
factor is perhaps the education system which determines the degree of equality of 
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provide relatively equal education opportunities and thus supposedly high social 
mobility.  
 
The education supply in itself is not enough to increase social mobility, however, as 
there are many other barriers to mobility. The first arises from differences in education 
demand between poor and rich families. Even if the direct costs of education were   
completely free, there will still be indirect costs (clothing, school supplies, transport, 
etc.) and opportunity costs (children cannot help as much with domestic and farm work) 
which tend to be relatively more important for poor families. Studying may also be 
more difficult and require more effort for poor children as their study environments are 
less ideal (lack of parental support, no computers and books at home, etc). Educational 
quality is another factor – incentives to place good teachers in remote rural areas are 
expensive and often inadequate. Bolivia has yet to become as urbanized as many 
neighboring countries, and the geography and difficult access to rural areas is another 
factor which challenges the provision of quality educational access to all regions of the 
country. 
 
A second type of barrier to social mobility are found in the labor market in the form of 
discrimination. Discrimination essentially reduces the returns to education for the 
groups of people who are discriminated against, making it less likely that these groups 
will make the necessary education investments. If jobs are allocated more on the basis 
of family, political, ethnic or social ties than on the basis of merit, this would have the 
same negative effect on social mobility and growth. 
 
A third barrier is found in the credit market. If people do not have access to credit at 
reasonable terms, they cannot make the investments necessary to improve their lives in 
the future. Bolivia is considered a pioneer in the microcredit market along with 
Bangladesh, and this financial sector appears to have weathered the ongoing economic 
crisis better than the traditional banking sector. In a relevant study of the poverty 
alleviation effects of microcredit in Bolivia (Navajas, 2000), the authors find that 
microcredit in Bolivia appears to serve not the very poorest but rather those on the 
upper edge of the poverty line. In addition, microcredit apparently serves more to 
smooth consumption rather than to increase incomes. It is to be expected, given the   22
resistance of this financial service sector to the economic downturn in the country, that 
microcredit will continue to expand throughout the country and consolidate market 
share in the near future. As consumption smoothing is important to ameliorate the 
opportunity costs of children attending school and thus reducing schooling gaps, access 
to microcredit may have important and measurable effects on social mobility in future 
generations. 
 
A fourth barrier is related to the marriage market. If people marry almost exclusively 
within their own social class, such marriage customs would tend to reduce social 
mobility. On the other hand, if people marry across social and economic classes, this 
would have a positive effect on social mobility and at the same time reduce inequality. 
 
It has also been shown that the degree of urbanization has an impact on social mobility, 
with highly urbanized countries enjoying more social mobility, and urban people 
typically being more socially mobile than rural people. This can be partly explained by 
the easier access to education in urban areas, but probably also by the wider range of 
work opportunities found in urban areas. Finally, high fertility rates, with the associated 
high dependency burdens, may also be an obstacle to social mobility.   
   
Below, we will explore the importance of some of these factors in the case of Bolivia 
and use the results to develop an agenda of policies for improving social mobility. 
 
4.1   The  education  system 
A free education system of high quality would seem the obvious way of improving 
social mobility. Theoretically, any child could then get the education he or she wanted, 
independently of his or her family background. However, the child’s idea of the ideal 
education may still depend on family background, so social mobility would not 
necessarily be perfect. 
 
The education system in Bolivia is very far from the target of being free and of 
uniformly high quality. Although close to 95% of 7-13 year olds attend school, most of 
them benefit little from the education in terms of future earnings, and many do not even 
learn the basic skills they are required to learn (Bolivia 2004).    23
 
Bolivian students, especially those in public schools, score very low on academic 
aptitude tests compared to students from other Latin American countries and the gap 
between public and private school students is among the highest in the region (see Chart 
7). This is a serious impediment for social mobility, since the poor who cannot afford 
private education, end up with an education that is substantially inferior to that of their 
richer counterparts, and this disadvantage is likely to carry through their entire lives and 
through the lives of their children too. 
 
Chart 7: Average scores on 4
th grade language test in 11 Latin American Countries, 
public and private schools, 1997 
               Source: UNESCO (1998). 
 
Bolivia has created a system of measurement of education quality (SIMECAL) to 
understand the magnitude and causes of the problems in the education system. Children 
are tested regularly and results compared with personal and school characteristics. 
Results indicate that an important reason for low and insufficient achievement is 
missing initial education or late school start.  
 
The importance of early school start is supported by the findings in Andersen (2001), 
which show that, across Latin American countries, the countries where children start 
school at age seven instead of age six (i.e. Guatemala, Brazil, Nicaragua, and 
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social mobility (see Chart 8). The correlation across Latin American countries between 
school start age and social mobility is –0.54, and the correlation between school starting 
age and teenage schooling gaps is 0.66, indicating that it is an advantage to send 
children to school at age six rather than seven. 
  
Chart 8: Social mobility and schooling gaps 
            Notes: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. In countries 
               marked with red, official school start age is 7 rather than 6.  
              Source: Andersen (2001).  
 
The results of SIMECAL suggest that it may be an advantage to send children to school 
even earlier than age six. Most rich families in Bolivia already send their children to 
pre-school around age three, implying that these children develop a firm habit of going 
to school, a habit of studying and learning, which will improve their grades and make it 
unlikely that they drop out of school prematurely. The children who have attended pre-
school have a three or four year advantage over the poor children that are not allowed to 
enter the public education system until after their sixth birthday. In rural Bolivia, many 
children delay starting school until they are seven or eight (Urquiola 2000). This is too 
late an age to establish a solid habit of studying, and the probability that these late 
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This suggests two necessary initiatives for Bolivian policy makers. First, they should 
offer pre-school facilities in public schools. Second, they should make sure that children 
do not start school too late. 
 
4.2   Discrimination 
Discrimination may be defined as unfair treatment of one person over another based on 
factors unrelated to their productivity. In Bolivia, there are many factors that are used to 
discriminate. Women, for example, typically earn about 25% less than men even if they 
have the same level of education and occupy similar positions (Mercado, Andersen & 
Muriel, 2003). Such gender based discrimination may be partly explained by the higher 
probability of shorter or more prolonged absences among women due to child bearing 
and rearing, but it would still tend to reduce the incentives for women to invest in 
education. 
 
Ethnicity is also a common ground for discrimination. Although a recent study by 
Mercado, Andersen & Muriel (2003) show that most of the wage discrimination against 
indigenous people can be explained by their lower quality of education, this will still 
reduce the incentives to invest in education for any individual indigenous person, as 
education quality is difficult to observe, and employers tend to just assume that 
indigenous people have attended low quality public schools in rural areas. A person 
would have to really stand out in order to overcome that basic assumption. 
 
In the public sector, which accounts for the gross share of total salary income in Bolivia, 
there is another discrimination factor that is extremely important – namely political 
affiliation. Jobs at all levels ranging from ministers to chauffeurs, especially in the 
government, are allocated based on party affiliation or family connections. Even 
teaching posts, which are clearly not the most attractive public sector positions, are 
distributed more on the basis of political affiliations than professional qualifications. In 
positions with more power (especially to extract rents) this unfortunate situation is even 
more pronounced, with 75% of all positions in the Internal Revenue Service being 
allocated on political grounds. The same holds for the Customs Agency. Outright 
purchasing of attractive public positions is also quite common (Kaufman, Mastruzzi & 
Zabaleta, 2002).   26
 
When public sector jobs are allocated more on the basis of gender, ethnicity, political 
affiliation, family connections or capacity to pay bribes than on merits and productivity, 
this not only dramatically reduces productivity, but also obstructs social mobility. Girls 
born in rural areas to poor, indigenous parents will face severe constraints in the labor 
market, no matter how talented and well-educated they might be. With such a massive 
handicap, it is no wonder if her parents find that investment in her education is likely to 
be a bad investment, and her fate is essentially determined from birth. 
 
4.3  The Marriage Market 
The marriage market can work either to increase or to decrease social mobility, 
depending on the degree of cross social sector marriages in the country. If people tend 
to marry only people from their own class, then social mobility is restrained by marriage 
customs. If, on the other hand, people often marry outside their class, then social 
mobility is promoted by the marriage market. In addition, inequality will be lower, since 
resources are spread out more evenly across households. 
 
A simple measure of the degree of cross social sector marriages is the correlation 
between spouses’ education levels, ρm. This correlation is generally high in Latin 
America – ranging from 0.67 in Costa Rica to 0.79 in Bolivia. The corresponding figure 
for the United States in 1990 is 0.62 (Kremer 1996). The higher the correlation, the 
lower the contribution to social mobility. 
 
In Bolivia, the marriage market contributes to low social mobility as the correlation 
between spouses’ education levels is extremely high (see Chart 9). 
   27
Chart 9: Social mobility and cross social sector marriages  
              Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. 
              Source: Andersen (2001).  
 
While a low degree of cross social sector marriages has a negative impact on equality 
and lowers social mobility, the situation also has a positive side. Becker (1991) argues 
that parents have a greater incentive to invest in their childrens’ education if this 
increases the child’s chance of marrying a desirable spouse. Kremer (1996) finds that an 
increase in ρm from 0.6 to 0.8 will increase the returns to investment in education by 
12.5 percent. In effect, imperfectly assortative marriage can be seen as a tax on parents’ 
investment in their children, with the proceeds going to the children-in-law (Kremer 
1996).  
 
The segmentation of marriage markets is also highly evident in the ethnic dimension. 
Table 3 shows that only 8% of all couples are mixed indigenous/non-indigenous while 
the remaining 92% find partners within their own ethnic group. In the group of mixed 
couples, the indigenous person tend to be better educated, and relatively well-off 
compared to the indigenous persons in non-mixed marriages, whereas the non-
indigenous persons tend to have less education and less income than their non-
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cases were we do observe ethnic mixing, it is only at the border – the “most attractive” 
indigenous persons marrying the “least attractive” non-indigenous persons.  
   
Table 3: Classification of Couples  




Indigenous/     
Non-indigenous 




Frequency 3292  640  4061  7993 
Percentage 41.19  8.01  50.81  100.00 
       Source: Authors’ elaboration based on MECOVI survey data (1999-2002) . 
 
While it is clear that the marriage customs in Bolivia contribute to low social mobility, 
public policy cannot do much to change this situation.  
 
4.4 Urbanization 
There is a tendency for highly urbanized countries to have higher social mobility than 
less urbanized countries, probably because it is easier for the governments to provide 
better quality education to everyone if the children are clustered together in urban 
centers. Chart 10 shows the relationship between urbanization rates and social mobility, 
with Argentina and Uruguay having 100% urbanization rates as the samples are solely 
from urban populations.   29
Chart 10: Social mobility and urbanization rates 
                  Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. 
                  Source: Andersen (2001).  
 
The positive relationship between urbanization rates and social mobility (ρ = 0.55) leads 
us to suspect that urban teenagers might be more socially mobile than rural teenagers. 
This is indeed the case in Bolivia where the SMI index is 0.8841 for urban teenagers 
and only 0.8239 for rural teenagers. The difference is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. 
 
The evidence presented on the relationship between urbanization and social mobility 
suggests one additional reason for encouraging rural-urban migration in Bolivia. It is 
much cheaper for the government to provide good quality schooling when students are 
gathered in urban centers to take advantage of economies of scale. 
 
4.5 Corruption 
Corruption has important effects on social mobility, especially when it implies that jobs 
are not allocated based on productivity considerations but rather on political or family 
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less access to certain jobs regardless of their qualifications, and their social mobility is 
thus reduced. 
 
It is difficult to measure these job-matching imperfections, but Chart 11 shows that the 
more general Corruption Perception Index from Transparency International also is 
highly correlated with our Social Mobility Index. Notice that the scale is inverted so that 
higher CPI scores imply less corruption. 
  
Chart 11: Social mobility and corruption 
 
                     Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. 
                     Source: Mercado et al (2003).  
 
A more detailed survey
4 concerning different kinds of corruption in different 
institutions, show that there is large variation in corruption across institutions in Bolivia. 
The Central Bank, the Ombudsman and the Constitutional Tribune, for example, score 
high on transparency and service delivery performance and low on bribery and 
politicization. The police force in Santa Cruz, on the other hand, scores very low on 
transparency and service delivery performance, and very high on bribery. The Customs 
Department, Tax Department, and High Court in Santa Cruz are also reported with high 
                                                 
4 A Survey of Public Officials (more than 1200 public officials working on over 100 different institutions) 



































































































levels of bribery and low performance, while the corresponding institutions in other 
regions are doing somewhat better. Some of the highest levels of politicization are 
found in La Paz, in the Municipal Government, in the Prefecture, and in the National 
Customs. 
 
Service delivery performance does not at all seem to be related to wage satisfaction 
within the institutions. The public officials in the Central Bank score very low on wage 
satisfaction, while those in the Tax Department and High Court of Santa Cruz score 
quite high.  
 
 
4.6 Population  growth 
Chart 12 shows that the negative correlation between population growth rates and social 
mobility is relatively strong (ρ = -0.54) and Bolivia is located in the “bad” end with 
high population growth rates and low social mobility. 
 
The strong correlation does not imply anything about causality, but it seems logical that 
high fertility rates, with the associated high dependency burdens, may be an obstacle to 
social mobility. At the macro-level, countries with high fertility rates will have 
difficulties in supplying basic services to the rapidly growing population, and the ones 
left without services are likely to be the poorest and most marginalized groups. For poor 
families, many children will likely imply less investment in each child due to a tight 
budget constraint, whereas this is not necessarily the case for richer families. This 
implies that high fertility is more of a problem for poor families and thus tend to reduce 
social mobility.    32
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Note: Argentina and Uruguay estimates are based on urban populations only. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. Population growth rates from www.worldbank.org. 
 
 
4.7  How to increase social mobility in Bolivia 
After revising both the theoretical and empirical literature on social mobility and 
investigating social mobility in Bolivia in particular, a number of policy 
recommendations can be extracted. We have divided them below under two main 




The education system is fundamental for achieving greater social mobility, and although 
the improvement of the public education system has been high on the agenda in Bolivia 
for at least a decade, the recommendations arising from the present analysis differ in 
important aspects.  
 
Traditionally, the main purpose of public investment in education has been to increase 
the general level of education in the country. For us, however, the main purpose is to 
create equality of opportunity and thus increase social mobility. The distinction is 
important because general increases in education levels will not necessarily have a   33
positive effect on average productivity and earnings. While investment in education is 
clearly important for earnings at the individual level, this is not necessarily the case at 
the macro level. A famous World Bank study even found a significantly negative effect 
of public education spending on economic growth (Pritchett, 1996) and listed the 
following three arguments to explain how this can be possible.  
 
First, education may work mostly as a signalling device, in which case you would find a 
positive benefit of education at the individual level, not because education has improved 
the individual’s productivity, but because education is a signal for innate talents. In this 
case, education will have no impact on growth at the macro-level, because it has not 
contributed to an increase in productivity. Indeed it may even decrease productivity as 
people are spending several years on unproductive studies rather than working. 
 
Second, marginal returns to education fall rapidly if demand for education is stagnant. 
In a very static society where the skill demand of employers do not change much over 
time, an increase in the general level of education may not translate into higher wages. 
It is quite possible that all jobs are occupied by the same people, with the same 
productivity, but all with two more years of education. In such a situation, higher 
education will not translate into higher incomes and higher growth . Even though well-
educated people earn higher salaries now than lesser educated people, this in no way 
implies that if everyone had more education, everyone would be earning higher salaries. 
Quite the contrary, a rapid increase in education levels might result in more educated 
people being unemployed, because demand is not increasing as fast as supply. 
 
Third, there may be perverse incentives causing people to educate themselves for 
counter-productive activities (bloated bureaucracy, rent-seeking activities, etc.). In this 
case education will prove to be beneficial at the private level, but not at the national 
level, as educated people would tend to engage in anti-social activities (e.g. corruption). 
 
This suggests that the aim of the public education system should not be just to give 
more education universally, but rather to ensure that all children receive an education 
that corresponds to and reinforces their innate talents and interests, thus providing that 
they can be as productive as possible in the future.  
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Since talents, interests and learning styles differ greatly from child to child, this requires 
a very flexible education system. The objective of the education system should be to 
help each child identify their talents and help them develop those talents, rather than just 
putting each and every child through the same standardized 12-year curriculum. It is 
important to develop the uniqueness in each person, as this is what pays in the labor 
market. Those who have unusual skills demand much higher salaries than those who 
have the most common combination of skills. 
 
Thus, we do not necessarily need more education, and we certainly do not need equality 
in education. What we need is that all people have access to individualized education 
that corresponds to their innate abilities and interests, so that they can become as 
productive as possible in their future work lives. This requires a completely different 
approach than the typical universal primary education strategy. 
 
The longer that people remain in the education system, the greater the possibilities to 
differentiate. However, the traditional focus on universal primary education means that 
the labor market receives a large number of people with average and very similar 
qualifications, which is going to help neither the employers nor the employees much. 
  
An individualized education system can take many forms, but it will always involve 
more options for the students. For example, children (together with their parents) should 
be able to choose which languages they want to learn and at which age, and they should 
be able to choose between abstract and more practical courses. For topics that are 
considered essential for all (such as math) they should be able to choose between basic 
and advanced levels, so that the students who choose the advanced level learn the topic 
in more depth as necessary for continued studies or work with heavy focus on that area, 
while children choosing the basic level learn sufficient material for everyday life. 
 
A more flexible learning environment is likely to reduce both drop-out rates and 
repetition rates, as children spend more time on the topics they enjoy and less time on 
topics they dislike. This will not only save money, but it will also save the children from 
experiences that can be very damaging for their self-esteem, and thus for their future 
income earning capacity. It is also important that children get introduced to the   35
education system at an early age, to take advantage of their natural curiosity and desire 
to learn and to establish good studying habits.  
  
More options for the students obviously mean more complications for the teachers and 
administrators. In small, rural schools where one or two teachers are responsible for all 
the classes, it will obviously be difficult to supply several different foreign languages 
and all imaginable topics at high level. However, these small schools have the 
advantage of teachers knowing each child better and thus better able to adjust to 
individual needs. In addition, the technological advances in the areas of 
telecommunication, computation, and virtual education are rapidly making 
flexibilization easier and cheaper.  
 
A better education system yielding higher returns to education is likely to have the 
additional benefit of reduced fertility, which was shown to be associated with higher 
social mobility. Fertility can of course also be affected directly by providing better 
access to and information about effective family planning methods.   
 
Corruption and rent-seeking 
 
The possibility of corruption and other privately profitable but socially damaging 
activities seriously reduce the possible benefits of higher social mobility. Equality of 
opportunity is no advantage if everyone wants to engage in rent seeking activities 
instead of productive activities that help generate sustainable growth in the long run. 
 
Due to the weakness of the private sector to generate gainful employment in Bolivia, 
public sector jobs are very attractive, and politicians use these sought-after jobs to buy 
favors, return favors and secure political support, largely disregarding considerations 
concerning qualifications and productivity. This not only hurts overall productivity, but 
also social mobility. People’s effort and qualifications should determine their job 
possibilities, not their family background and political connections.  
 
The malfunctioning of large parts of the public service sector due to politicization and 
clientilism is widely acknowledged and large and expensive efforts have been launched 
to improve the situation. In 1992, a civil service reform program was initiated to create   36
a corps of technically competent and motivated public employees that would not be 
forced out with every change of ministers. The aim was to create a critical mass of 
around 2500 employees, yet by 1997, less than 250 positions had been included in this 
categorization, and this number decreased to only 30 by 1998 due to extremely low 
retention rates, so the program lost credibility and stopped (Kaufman, Mastruzzi & 
Zabaleta, 2002).  
 
Institutional strengthening remains one of the top priorities for the international 
development community in Bolivia. Between 1998 and 2002, the international 
cooperation partners spent more than $400 million on this topic, corresponding to 15% 
of total outlays -- more than they devoted to education and health together. Despite the 
great emphasis and large amount of funds devoted to institutional strengthening, results 
have been very disappointing. Since the launch of the new program of institutional 
reform (PRI) in the year 2000, only about 2000 public positions have been 
institutionalized, compared to the 42,417
5 public positions listed in the national public 
servants registry. It is also discouraging to note that only 26.5% of public servants 
declare that they have entered the institution in a public competitive process (Andersen 
& Evia, 2003).  
 
It is not only illegal activities, such as corruption and direct robbery, which distort the 
incentives and obstructs the correct functioning of the economy. Many legal activities 
also skew incentives against sustainable productive activities. One example is foreign 
aid, which contributes close to 10% of Bolivia’s GDP through thousands of short and 
medium term projects. Many of these projects have no permanent impact, and attract 
human and financial resources away from other, possibly more sustainable and 
productive, activities (see Andersen & Evia, 2003). Another example is the abundance 
of natural resources, which tempts the country to rely on the exploitation of non-
renewable resources instead of producing goods and services in a sustainable manner.  
 
                                                 
5 This figure comprises the central administration, decentralized institutions of departmental 
administrations, municipal governments, judiciary power, legislative power, electoral court, and the 
administrative staff of the health and education sector. It does not include the rural and public teachers, 
administrative staff and professors of public universities, police, army, and the foreign service.   37
The small size of the domestic market coupled with the country’s lack of sovereign 
coastal access are two exogenous factors limiting growth of the productive sector. The 
task of implementing the political and institutional changes that are needed to eliminate 
misgovernance and reduce rent-seeking behaviour is daunting since most of these 
changes would go against the interests of the majority of insiders. Nevertheless, it is 
essential to improve the functioning of the economy. Productive activities in the private 
sector have to become relatively more attractive than rent-seeking activities in the 
public sector, and at the same time it would be desirable to make the formal sector 
relatively more attractive than the informal sector.  This implies a range of initiatives 
ranging from the reduction of public sector salaries (already in progress) to the 
provision of public services for the private productive sector (typically infrastructure 
and technical education). 
 
5 Conclusions 
     
This paper has shown that despite decades of concerted national and international 
efforts to reduce poverty, Bolivia still has some of the highest poverty rates in Latin 
America, with virtually no improvement in the very poor rural areas. Although Bolivia 
has meticulously followed the recommendations of the Washington consensus at the 
same time as external aid has been generous and foreign direct investment has boomed, 
average productivity and incomes remain at the same low level as they were both 20 
and 50 years ago. 
 
The paper argues that the failure of previous development policies is due to a lack of 
social mobility in the country. Without social mobility, there is little incentive for 
people to invest in human and physical capital, and without investment there cannot be 
productivity growth. In addition, the lack of social mobility implies an inefficient use of 
human capital, and it hinders the construction of efficient social mechanisms of 
redistribution and consumption smoothing over the life-cycle. 
 
Efforts to improve social mobility in Bolivia should concentrate on the public education 
system and the elimination of corruption and misgovernance. Social mobility may also   38
be increased through improvements in the functioning of credit markets and through 
improved family planning services.  
 
While we do not necessarily need more education or more equality in education, we do 
need a better and more flexible education system that is capable of supplying an 
individualized education appropriate to the talents and interests of each child, 
independently of family background. The education system should help each child 
identify their unique talents and secure them the possibility of developing those talents, 
so that each person can become as productive as possible during their future work life. 
In this way the human capital in the society can be used more optimally, thus permitting 
higher growth rates. 
 
While high growth requires high social mobility, this is not a sufficient condition. It is 
also required that productive activities yield higher returns to talent than to 
unproductive rent seeking activities. If talent is attracted to rent seeking activities rather 
than productive activities, then no amount of social mobility can generate growth. It is 
therefore a very high priority that corruption be reduced so that productive activities 




There are two main directions in which the work on social mobility could be extended 
and improved. The first is to add a time dimension to the social mobility index in order 
to test the hypothesis that social mobility has improved in Bolivia during the last couple 
of decades. Having several observations of the social mobility index over time would 
also help establish the level of confidence we should have in this measure. If it varies 
wildly from year to year, it is not a very useful measure, whereas it would be interesting 
to determine whether there is a clear trend over time. A time series would also permit 
testing the causality hypotheses presented in this paper, to determine the direction of 
influence between related events. 
 
The second direction of improvement would be to take into account differences in 
education quality in order to reduce the systematic biases that the omission of this   39
causes in the estimated social mobility index. The simplest way to do this would be to 
include a dummy for public/private education in the schooling gap regressions, but 
unfortunately such information is not always available. More elaborate techniques to 
estimate school quality for young people in Bolivia have been proposed by Andersen & 
Muriel (2002) and applied in Mercado, Andersen & Muriel (2003). 
 
It is also clear that much more research is needed on effective ways to reduce corruption 
and public mismanagement in Bolivia. There have been some successes and many 
failures, and lessons should be learned from these. 
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APPENDIX A: Using the Fields’ Decomposition to Estimate Social Mobility  
In this appendix we will first provide a theoretical derivation of the Fields’ 
Decomposition methodology, and then we will explain with an example how it is used 
to estimate the Social Mobility Index. 
A theoretical derivation of the Fields’ Decomposition 
Consider a standard earnings regression: 
where Y is a vector of log wages for all individuals in the sample and Z is a matrix with 
j explanatory variables, including an intercept, years of education, experience, 
experience squared, gender, etc for each individual. 
 
A simple measure of inequality is the variance of the log wage. We therefore take the 
variance on both sides of the earnings equation. The right hand side can be manipulated 
using the following theorem: 
 
Theorem (Mood, Graybill, and Boes): Let Z1,…,ZJ and 
Y1,…,YM be two sets of random variables and a1,…,aJ and 
b1,…,bM be two sets of constants. Then 
 
 
Applying the theorem in the context of a single random variable Y=∑jajZj, we have 
 
But since the left-hand side of this expression is the covariance between Y and itself, it 
is simply the variance of Y. Thus, 
∑ =
j
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Or, upon dividing through by σ
2(Y), 
 
Where each sj is given by 
 
The sj’s are the factor inequality weights (F.I.W.) and they add to 1 over all explanatory 
factors.  
 
The factor inequality weights can be normalized to sum to R
2 instead of 1, in which case 
each F.I.W. will indicate the share of total variation in the dependent variable explained 
by each explanatory variable, rather than the share of explained variation. This is the 
version we will use to estimate the Social Mobility Index.  
 
Using the Fields’ Decomposition for calculating the Social Mobility Index 
 
The Fields’ Decomposition allows us to judge the importance of each explanatory 
variable by its factor inequality weights (F.I.W.). For example, the Fields’ 
Decomposition for the regression shown in Table A1 below, shows a F.I.W. for maxedu 
(the maximum of parents’ years of education) of smaxedu = 0.1316, which means that 
maxedu explains 13.16 percent of the total variation in education gaps for teenagers. 
The F.I.W. for hhypc (adult household income per capita) is shhypc = 0.0680, implying 
that hhypc explains 6.8 percent of the total variation in education gaps. Together, these 
two family background variables explain 19.96 percent of the total variation in 
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These two variables (adult household income per capita and the maximum years of 
education of the parents) are chosen to represent family background. If family 
background is important we will say that social mobility is low, and vice versa. We 
therefore define the Social Mobility Index as:  
 
SMI = 1 – (smaxedu + shhypc ). 
 
For the example above, this results in a SMI = 1 – (0.0680 + 0.1316) = 0.8004. 
 
Table A1: Regression results and SMI for Bolivia 
Regression with robust standard errors                           Number of obs =    5444 
                                                                 F(  7,     8) =   36.29 
                                                                 Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                                 R-squared     =  0.3773 
Number of clusters (region) = 9                                  Root MSE      =  2.0214 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            |               Robust 
  edugap    |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Income p.c. |   -.316826   .0432022     -7.334   0.000      -.4164505   -.2172016 
Max. Edu.   |   -.147658   .0101576    -14.537   0.000      -.1710814   -.1242347 
Age head    |  -.0055892   .0037234     -1.501   0.172      -.0141753     .002997 
Female head |   -.357662   .1738904     -2.057   0.074      -.7586539    .0433299 
Single head |  -.2484492   .1430467     -1.737   0.121      -.5783155     .081417 
Younger sis.|   .1249404   .0842932      1.482   0.177        -.06944    .3193208 
Younger bro.|   .1272927   .0798303      1.595   0.149      -.0567963    .3113818 
Older sist. |   .0017617   .0467524      0.038   0.971      -.1060496     .109573 
Older broth.|   .1153901   .0547652      2.107   0.068      -.0108986    .2416789 
Female      |   .1179128   .0766911      1.538   0.163      -.0589371    .2947627 
Age         |    .355573   .0421096      8.444   0.000       .2584681    .4526779 
Indigenous  |   -.025555    .146361     -0.175   0.866       -.363064    .3119541 
Adopted     |    .350004   .1473414      2.375   0.045       .0102342    .6897738 
Selfemp. rur|  -.8796557   .3543126     -2.483   0.038      -1.696702   -.0626094 
Selfemp. urb|  -.0759208   .1091731     -0.695   0.506      -.3276744    .1758328 
Av.reg.inc. |   .7471495   .3271741      2.284   0.052      -.0073152    1.501614 
Av.reg.edu. |  -.4406741   .2270024     -1.941   0.088      -.9641426    .0827944 
Urban       |  -1.014207   .2602072     -3.898   0.005      -1.614246    -.414168 
Inc.imputed |    1.13518   .1358325      8.357   0.000       .8219493     1.44841 




Fields decomposition and Social Mobility Index 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
X                   Coeff.     Sd(X)  Corr(X,Y)    F.I.W. 
 
Income p.c.        -0.3168    1.3696   -0.4007    0.0680 
Max. Edu.          -0.1477    4.9618   -0.4593    0.1316 
Age head           -0.0056   10.9252    0.1087   -0.0026 
Female head        -0.3577    0.3678   -0.0372    0.0019 
Single head        -0.2484    0.3850   -0.0198    0.0007 
Younger sis.        0.1249    0.4864    0.0898    0.0021 
Younger bro.        0.1273    0.4761    0.0977    0.0023 
Older sist.         0.0018    0.4700   -0.0656    0.0000 
Older broth.        0.1154    0.4820   -0.0228   -0.0005 
Female              0.1179    0.4997    0.0069    0.0002 
Age                 0.3556    1.8926    0.2299    0.0605 
Indigenous         -0.0256    0.4584    0.2163   -0.0010 
Adopted             0.3500    0.3090    0.0227    0.0010 
Selfemp. rur       -0.8797    0.1735    0.0106   -0.0006 
Selfemp. urb       -0.0759    0.3408   -0.1029    0.0010   45
Av.reg.inc          0.7471    0.4186   -0.1212   -0.0148 
Av.reg.edu         -0.4407    0.6844   -0.1717    0.0203 
Urban              -1.0142    0.4753   -0.4053    0.0764 
Inc. imputed        1.1352    0.2674    0.2598    0.0308 
 
Sum of Factor Inequality Weights = 0.3773 
 
Social Mobility Index = 0.8004 (SD = 0.0095; 95% confidence interval: [0.7819:0.8202]) 